Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University by Abrams, Kathryn
Book Reviews
Songs of Innocence and Experience:
Dominance Feminism in the University
The Morning After: Sex, Fear and Feminism on Campus. By Katie Roiphe*
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993. Pp. xii, 180.
Kathryn Abramst
Feminists have had notorious difficulty handling challenges from within
our ranks. The "sex wars"' struggle, in which opponents of pornography and
advocates of sexual expression tarred each other with claims of false
consciousness, produced lingering hostilities. Mainstream feminists first decried
the race critique as freighting their efforts with "extra baggage," and only
slowly recognized that it exposed a dynamic of erasure within feminism itself.
In the wake of the antagonism and wasted effort produced by these failures,
some feminists have voiced an unsteady resolve: to give ear to the unorthodox
in feminism, to attempt to reconceive feminist efforts along pluralist lines.
This resolve has been challenged by the emerging controversy over "date
rape" on university campuses. Camille Paglia fired the first shot, charging that
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1. The term "sex wars" is frequently used to describe the ongoing controversy between (self-described)
anti-pornography and pro-sex feminists, which began with the 1982 Barnard sexuality conference and
continued through several campaigns around the MacKinnon-Dworkin anti-pornography ordinance. See
Carole Vance, More Pleasure, More Danger: A Decade After the Barnard Sexuality Conference, in
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campus rape policies resurrect parental protection, creating a generation of
women unable to enjoy the "sizzle" of sex or protect themselves against its
inevitable excesses.2 Paglia's scattershot cultural indictment and adulation of
a dark, immutable male sexuality ("Guess what, it's hot.")3 confounded her
message and made it difficult to gauge her target. Yet Paglia's challenge has
been seconded in ways that are more difficult to ignore. Writing in the New
York Yimes Magazine, Katie Roiphe warned that exaggerated claims of date
rape "betray[] feminism" by portraying women as fragile, vulnerable, and
unable to negotiate the "libidinous jostle" of contemporary life without
paternalistic rules and restrictions.4 With the publication of her book, The
Morning After: Sex, Fear, and Feminism on Campus,5 Roiphe adds to the date
rape critique the voice of an author explicitly concerned about the future of
feminism.
Roiphe's book is ultimately unsatisfying, for both stylistic and substantive
reasons. Its narrative is bathed in second-hand nostalgia for a golden age of
sexual revelry that Roiphe never witnessed. Its subtext-that sexualized
oppression is mainly a problem inside women's heads-is absurd outside the
rarified atmosphere Roiphe describes, and makes little sense within it. Its
relentless portraits of shrill campus leaders and their sulking, maladjusted
followers will try the patience of all but the most generous feminist readers.
Yet the book's larger message is one that feminists cannot afford to ignore. As
a student drawing on recent experience, Roiphe speaks from the vortex of the
controversy. While her rhetoric reflects the current taste for mocking "political
correctness," her concern with women's fear-filled abdication of the sexual
realm has a more established pedigree.
Roiphe's book voices the concerns of a subset of feminists, women old
enough to have participated in the "sex wars" and young enough to dominate
"Generation X." These women worry about whether depictions of pervasive
male aggression and coercion imply female passivity; and whether advocacy
of expanded legal protection signals a return to paternalism, or undermines a
woman's assertion of individual responsibility for her own direction and
security. They want to fight against the oppression of women without
surrendering their belief in the present possibility of women's agency. The
publication of Roiphe's book provides an occasion for feminists who do not
share her views to think seriously about how to respond.
2. See CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEX, ART AND AMERICAN CULTURE 49-74 (1992).
3. Id. at 57.
4. Katie Roiphe, Date Rape's Other Victim, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 13, 1993, at 26.
5. KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993) [hereinafter
THE MORNING AFTER].
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I. DATE RAPE'S OTHER VICTIM
Roiphe argues that a campus movement that depicts women as victims of
pervasive male sexual aggression has transformed feminists into thought police,
and women into fragile vessels. Feminism has joined hands, she contends, with
both authoritarianism 6 and the recovery movement.7 The result is a growing
wall of legal and social restrictions, and behind it, a generation of women who
obsess about trauma and violation, yet lack the will or the savvy to direct their
own sexual lives.8
As stem as Roiphe's conclusions might seem, her argument is not
structured as a polemic. It emerges from impressionistic portraits of college
life, the apparently ludicrous extremes of which frame Roiphe's indictment. In
form, her stories are oddly reminiscent of the narratives of Patricia Williams,
an author who shares few of Roiphe's substantive perspectives.9 Like
Williams, Roiphe is a perplexed observer, a foreign correspondent in a world
gone awry; she is confident in her own perceptions, yet vertiginously aware
that they challenge the sanity of all those around her.
The main thrust of Roiphe's argument is delivered in the first four
chapters. The first chapter, "The Blue Light System," describes the cloud of
sexual fear that has settled over many American campuses. Prodded on the one
hand by campus education on date rape and, on the other, by growing concerns
about the spread of AIDS, 0 students' lives are pervaded by a sense of
vulnerability, a new and discomforting awareness that sexuality connotes
6. Id. at 60-69.
7. Id. at 30-38, 79-81. when Roiphe refers to "recovery," she describes a process of self-examination
and reinterpretation through which a person comes to understand that she has been crucially shaped by an
experience or injury, whose impact-whether because of submersion or denial-has not been consciously
confronted. This process is often undertaken collectively, through groups constituted of individuals with
a particular kind of injury or exposure, such as Alcoholics Anonymous, Gamblers Anonymous, or Adult
Children of Alcoholics. The initial goal of such efforts is the recognition of the injury or dependence. The
ensuing "recovery" process is one through which a person begins to reshape her life in relation to that
recognition, to live despite it but with an awareness of the influence it exerts. In her discussions of what
she calls the "recovery movement," Roiphe generally focuses her derision on its emphasis on public
acknowledgement and revelation of injury, collective encouragement and support, and individual self-
celebration. However, I understand her larger point to be that the effort of excavating submerged injuries
and learning to accommodate their pervasive effect on one's life through a sustained, temporarily extended
process can encourage one toward an identification with, or investment in one's injuries that can make it
difficult to get on with the other projects that constitute one's life. I have sympathy with this point,
although recovery programs may vary in the extent to which they characterize the individual as capable
of asserting herself against the effects of the injury, rather than relying on some external force or power,
and the extent to which they describe recovery as a finite process rather than an on-going and ultimately
uncompletable journey. I am less concerned with this problem, however, than with the way that recovery
can encourage an inward focus on individual injury, rather than a collective effort to address the conditions
that helped give rise to it. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
8. Id. at 30-43, 97-99.
9. Many exemplary narratives by Williams are contained in her recent book, PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIomTs (1991). I would add, however, that Roiphe possesses neither Williams'
literary grace, nor her acute eye for the normative complexity of the everyday.
10. THE MORNING AFrER, supra note 5, at 21-27.
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risk." At first, Roiphe handles this theme with poignant balance; as the
chapter proceeds, however, that balance gradually tips in a single direction.
According to Roiphe, college women's obsessive focus on weight and fitness
reflects an effort to "elud[e] the pressures of the outside world,"'12 and the
bathroom graffiti writers "aren't worried about enough freedom anymore-they
are worried about too much danger."' 3 She argues that in the date rape and
safe-sex workshops students don't simply learn how to make refusal or
condom use less embarrassing, they also learn how to acquiesce in politically
prescribed views of the world.' 4 "I look for signs of frustration, rebellion,
dissent," Roiphe writes, "but there are only heads nodding in consensus."" 5
The result is that the "hard, bright, hedonistic light' 6 of sexual freedom and
experimentation-which Roiphe views as the birthright of the post-
adolescent-has been replaced by the "blue light" of campus safety. 7
The "date rape crisis," the primary protagonist in this struggle to instill
fear, is the focus of the following two chapters. In "Taking Back the Night,"
Roiphe offers a montage of images from the yearly marches that have become
a cultural ritual in American campus life. To Roiphe, these marches represent
the apogee of feminism as recovery: emotion-drenched spectacles of mutual
affirmation in which young women discover the revelation of sexual violation
as a route to power. Roiphe is frankly contemptuous of these events, dissecting
the dress and bearing of the participants, parodying their utterances of support
and the homogeneity of their discourse, pointing out instances in which the
emotion of the moment has led women to embroider or fabricate rape
charges. 8 Her frustration with these public displays contrasts sharply with her
sympathetic rendition of a more personal revelation:
Once, over a cup of coffee, a friend told me that she had been raped
by a stranger with a knife. I was startled. Small, neat, self-contained,
she was not someone prone to bursts of self-revelation. She described
it, the flash of the knife, the scramble, the exhaustion, the decision to
keep her mind blank, the bruises and the police. After she had
finished, she quickly resumed her competent, business-as-usual
attitude, her toughness, but I could tell how hard it had been for her
to tell me. I felt terrible for her. I felt like there was nothing I could
say.'9
11. Id. at 12-15.
12. Id. at 21.
13. Id. at 19.
14. Id. at 22-23.
15. Id. at 23.
16. Id. at 27.
17. Id. at 27-28.
18. Id. at 39. In support of this generalization, Roiphe offers only two accounts of women who
fabricated rape stories. Id. at 39-42.
19. Id. at 43.
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This abbreviated, furtive revelation, made almost without breaking stride to a
listener who remains trapped behind the silence of her own discomfort is, to
Roiphe's mind, a normative point of reference. It is a model that neither blunts
women's individuality nor "celebrate[s] their vulnerability .... [their] victim
status."'2 The distance between this conversation, and the spectacles in which
vulnerability and broken silence are parlayed into power, prompts Roiphe to
investigate "not... what the marchers are saying, but ... why.'
'z1
Roiphe's ensuing scrutiny of the date rape crisis takes up the following
chapter of the book., In "The Rape Crisis, or 'Is Dating Dangerous?'," she
argues that the "one-in-four statistic," the "epidemic" of date rape on
campuses, reflects not a change in behavior but a new way of interpreting
sexual encounters.22 Primed by freshman orientation programs that tout the
pervasive hazards of non-public encounters, of mixing alcohol and sex, and of
emotional as well as physical coercion, young women have begun to feel
pressure and see danger in all heterosexual interaction.23 Not only does
Roiphe see in such warnings restrictive codes of ladylike conduct worthy of
her grandmother's time, she also sees familiar images of fragility and
asexuality in the portraits of guileless, bamboozled women.' "The
assumption embedded in the movement against date rape is . . . [that] men
want sex, women don't," Roiphe argues. "In emphasizing the struggle-he
pushing, she resisting-the rape-crisis movement recycles and promotes an old
model of sexuality. ' ' 5
To Roiphe's mind, the conviction that sex is "our Tower of Babel,''26 a
zone of confusion and mutual misunderstanding, and the resultant longing for
a simpler time of sexual innocence and social predictability, are baggage that
feminists can do without:
Imagine men sitting around in a circle talking about how she called
him impotent and how she manipulated him into sex, how violated
and dirty he felt afterward, how coercive she was, how she got him
drunk first, how he hated his body and couldn't eat for three weeks
afterward. Imagine him calling this rape. Everyone feels the weight
of emotional pressure at one time or another. The question is not
whether people pressure each other, but how that pressure is
transformed in our mind and culture into full-blown assault. There
would never be a rule or a law, or even a pamphlet or peer-counseling
group, for men who claimed to have been emotionally raped or
verbally pressured into sex. And for the same reasons-assumptions
20. Id. at 44.
21. Id. at 50.
22. Id. at 53.
23. Id. at 57-60.
24. Id. at 66-69.
25. Id. at 63.
26. Id. at 76.
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of basic competence, free will, and strength of character-there should
be no such rules or groups or pamphlets for women.27
Into this prospective vacuum, Roiphe moves a generalized prescription for
individual action: take responsibility for your own situation, resist a man when
you want to resist, and take up that "hard, bright, hedonistic light" of sexual
expression when you prefer.2 8 This approach contains no grandmotherly
warnings, no Victoriana; yet it is hard to miss the conflicting currents of
Nancy Reagan and Erica Jong.
Feminist campaigns against sexual harassment, the subject of the chapter
Roiphe titles "Reckless Eyeballing: Sexual Harassment on Campus," represent
the ultimate elevation of the trivial to the status of an injury. Shifting their
attack from quid pro quo proposals by professors to jokes, leers, and epithets
from classmates, campus feminists "propose the right to be comfortable as a
feminist principle.' 29 The problem with this approach, opines Roiphe,
sounding almost Paglian, is that:
[T]hough it may infringe on the right to comfort, unwanted sexual
attention is part of nature. To find wanted sexual attention, you have
to give and receive a certain amount of unwanted sexual attention.
Clearly, the truth is that if no one was ever allowed to risk offering
unsolicited sexual attention, we would all be solitary creatures.3"
Roiphe argues that sexual harassment education, now a staple on most
campuses, deepens the harm perpetuated by date rape orientations. By
suggesting that women are vulnerable to jokes or looks, and by implying that
female professors can be harassed by male students, such programs teach
women that they are "hothouse flowers," unable to sustain the pressures of a
frankly sexual world.31 These programs also exacerbate the damaging effects
of the "cult of recovery," in which women are more likely to nurse their
violations than to take action to prevent them. 2
According to Roiphe, the politicization of apparently harmless acts
produces codes of "etiquette," at best absurdly straitening for all concerned, at
27. Id. at 68-69.
28. Id. at 68-69, 101-02.
29. Id. at 87.
30. Id. at 87.
31. Id. at 108-09.
32. Roiphe offers as evidence the story of a classmate:
She was at a crowded party, leaning against a wall, and a big jock came up to her, placed his
hands at either side of her head, and pretended to lean against her, saying, So, baby, when are
we going out? All right, he didn't touch me, she says, but he invaded my space. He had no
right to do that.
She has carred this first instance of sexual harassment around in her head for six years.
It is the beginning of a long list.
Id. at 98.
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worst reminiscent of the cultural prohibitions that made "reckless eyeballing"
of white women an offense punishable by lynching for black men. A better
answer is to depoliticize, or at least to decollectivize, the response to
sexualizing acts. "Interpreting leers and leer-type behavior as a violation is a
choice,"33 Roiphe insists, sounding perilously like that earlier avatar of racial
insight, the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson.34 For more serious
offenses, she finds that an imaginative response is required:
Someone I knew in college had an admirable flair for putting
offenders in their place. Once, when she was playing pinball in [a
campus coffee shop] ... a teenage boy came up to her and grabbed
her breast. She calmly went to the counter and ordered a glass of milk
and then walked over and poured it over his head.3
After the pugnacious brio of these opening chapters,' Roiphe's narrative
rapidly runs out of steam. "The Mad Hatter's Tea Party," which might more
accurately be entitled "Lifestyles of the Rich and Feminist," is a series of
portraits of campus women and men; they highlight, with a breathtaking lack
of generosity, the personal absurdities and contradictions produced by
experimentation with feminist politics and academic forms of feminist
discourse.36 "Catharine MacKinnon, the Antiporn Star," is a sometimes
perceptive reflection on the theorist whose work informs the rape-crisis
analysis. This chapter may be more interesting to a lay audience than to legal
scholars who have analyzed MacKinnon at length, and who have become
accustomed to her galvanizing presence on the academic scene. 37 "Still
Looking for Mr. Goodbar" is an attempt at synthesis, a wandering, graduation-
day rumination on the kinds of fantasies and nightmares created by four years
of campus fear. With a brief afterword on the intermittent need to fight one's
friends, the book closes.
33. Id. at 102.
34. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). There the majority opinion stated:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that
the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If
this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.
Il at 551 (emphasis added).
35. THE MORNING AFTER, supra note 5, at 101.
36. Id. at 113-37.
37. There is something disturbingly incomplete about describing MacKinnon as a superstar, with no
mention of the decade MacKinnon spent moving from institution to institution, her theories reviled by
colleagues and contested among feminists. While it is true that one is under no ethical obligation to
document the humble beginnings of current superstars (e.g. you don't have to talk about Madonna's
beginnings in Bay City, Michigan), Roiphe's omission here is part of a larger pattern that is more troubling.
Her reluctance to report the ways in which feminism has been embattled as well as triumphant, its leading
figures pariahs more often than superstars, makes it easier for her to present "rape crisis" feminism as an
ascendant, if not hegemonic, force on university campuses.
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II. CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS?
Roiphe is, in some respects, a peculiar subject of attention for feminist
legal theorists. An intemperate attack on feminism by a student writing in a
popular vein is not the stuff of which feminist scholarship is generally made.
Yet there is more reason for engaging the provocative message of this flawed
book than might first appear.
The popular focus of the book may place it beyond the scope of some
feminist theoretical projects, but squarely within the domain of others. The
recent renaissance of popular feminist writing38 may be the first to take place
against the backdrop of a substantial and largely institutionalized body of
feminist scholarship. If these movements are not to work at cross-purposes,
feminists in both genres ought to give thought to their inter-relations: writers
like Roiphe, Paglia, and Naomi Wolf might have had more difficulty making
a target out of victim feminism, for example, if academic feminists had been
more attentive to the way that dominance principles were being presented in
popular settings.39
There is likewise no reason to conclude that Roiphe's antagonistic tone
places her beyond the purview of feminist response. Roiphe is, on the weight
of the evidence presented, a complicated person, with a complicated
relationship to the events detailed in her book. She may seek to redirect
38. A range of popular books by young feminist authors have recently attracted wide attention. Many
of them could be understood to address the paradox that many young women today favor a range of
opportunities for women yet decline to identify themselves as "feminists." See, e.g., NAOMI WOLF, FIRE
WITH FIRE: THE NEW FEMALE POWER AND HOW IT CAN CHANGE THE 21ST CENTURY (1993); and SUSAN
FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR ON AMERICAN WOMEN (1991). While Susan Faludi blames
mainstream cultural forces for the negative connotations of "feminism," Roiphe and Naomi Wolf finger the
feminist tendency to depict women as victims. There are pointed differences between Wolf and Roiphe's
delivery of this message: Wolf is more precise in her target, differentiating "victim feminism" from more
promising varieties, while Roiphe's comparatively indiscriminate attack threatens to throw the baby out with
the bathwater. Perhaps more importantly, Wolf advances an affirmative program under the rubric of "power
feminism," with which one may or may not agree, but Which avoids the individualistic and solipsistic
aspects of Roiphe's isolated suggestions. See infra pp. 1546-47. However, both might be included under
the rubric of what columnist Anna Quindlen has trenchantly labelled "babe feminism," which tries to
expand the reach of the movement and reassure discomfited men by modifying the feminist message to
make it more (hetero)sexy and less threatening. See Anna Quindlen, And Now, Babe Feminism, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 1994, at A21. Viewed less critically, these feminist efforts may be understood as part of
a broader literature that attempts to rescue multiculturalism from victimization rhetoric. See ROBERT
HUGHES, THE CULTURE OF COMPLAINT (1992).
39. The need for some integration of popular and scholarly efforts may be particularly great for
feminist legal theorists, as the hard work of litigated feminist change often depends on the understandings
of "lay" women and men. The cultural developments Roiphe describes have been shaped by a particular
regime of legal and regulatory enforcement: they reflect attitudes borne of legal imagery, and expectations
about regulatory intervention and response. Understanding of these social and cultural currents-and how
they are likely to affect activists and clients-is crucial to the performance of our professional task.
40. Tucked away in a section of "The Mad Hatter's Tea Party" is the revelation that Roiphe's views,
as expressed in an early editorial in the New York Times, were harshly protested by some of her feminist
classmates in graduate school. THE MORNING AFTER, supra note 5, at 128. These students circulated a
petition against her among graduate students and some faculty; they posted it in the English department
and placed copies in mailboxes. They then determined that to look at or speak to Roiphe "would be to
betray the cause." Id. This level of ostracism is severe, and might be expected to have had a strong effect
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campus politics-and to punish those feminists who treated her harshly, and
to exploit a literary market that embraced the likes of Dinesh D'Souza. While
such calculated positioning may not be what most of us look for in a feminist
spokesperson, neither is it cause for excommunication. Moreover, the
resonance of Roiphe's argument with earlier, less solipsistic defenses of female
sexual agency makes the questions that she raises genuinely important. To my
mind, the question is not whether The Morning After is actually a challenge
from within feminism-a question we can probably never answer-but
whether discussing this book, whatever its motivation and positioning,
contributes to feminist thinking. I will examine this question, first by asking
how the book succeeds on its own terms, and second by exploring the inquiries
to which it points.
Roiphe's signal contribution may be descriptive. Her book is a dispatch,
not simply from an Alice-in-Wonderland world gone awry, but from a new
frontier of feminism. Roiphe's classmates are among the first to come of age
at a time when feminist theory and practice have permeated many aspects of
university life. College is a time for trying on roles and experimenting with
personal styles-a point Roiphe seems to grasp in the realm of the sexual and
miss everywhere else. It is fascinating to see young women do with H6lne
Cixous or Catharine MacKinnon what my classmates and I did with Jurgen
Habermas or Michel Foucault: think about the implications of their work for
one's personal posture, and toy with the elements of an intellectual style. The
same-though this is an older project-goes for the effort to reconcile one's
personal style with one's feminist convictions, particularly in the murky waters
of heterosexual engagement. The personal accommodations Roiphe indicts as
being contradictory or shallow strike me as interesting and poignant: they
reflect the awkwardness and transitional imbalance that social change demands
of all of us, writ large on the canvas of college life.
Of course, Roiphe's main point is not to expose heterogeneity and
experimentation, but to decry its opposite: the pressure for conformity, around
a flawed and counterproductive image of women, that has become the hallmark
of campus feminism. Here, too, Roiphe makes some important points. It is
useful, although hardly novel, to be reminded of the danger that resistance and
rebellion can imperceptibly be transformed into orthodoxy. It is instructive to
see how feminism, a movement which originally joined personal to political,
has been privatized or even depoliticized through its link to recovery rhetoric
and practice. It is important to see in practice what "sex wars" partisans have
long warned in theory: that exposing the pervasiveness of male sexual
domination may project images of women as passive, fragile, and repelled by
on a 23- or 24-year old. Although Roiphe notes in the Introduction that "[t]his book comes out of
frustration, out of anger, out of the names I've been called," id. at 7, she does not specifically address the
impact of this episode on her view of campus feminism, supporting my impression that Roiphe is
ambivalent about being a protagonist in her own drama. See infra pp. 1542-43.
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sexuality. But whether we take Roiphe's book as she does, as an indictment
of a burgeoning feminist authoritarianism, or as a warning about a tension in
some strains of feminist thinking, depends upon the persuasiveness with which
she makes her case.
Roiphe's narrative methodology makes her argument hard to assess. An
author who offers her analysis through impressionistic images is unlikely to
"prove" to readers, in the objectivist sense, that there is a campus crisis of
sexual interpretation. Roiphe does not render the full texts of university "date
rape" pamphlets; she doesn't tell us, on a case-by-case basis, whether this
education was compulsory, whether students had access to alternative sources
of information, whether there were counter-reactions, or whether all students
responded with the docility Roiphe recalls among her classmates. A narrative
approach cannot offer readers "hard" data of this sort. This may mean, of
course, that narrative is not the optimal vehicle for supporting an indictment
as broad as Roiphe's seems to be. But even if we take Roiphe's argument as
a more limited critique of the few environments she has directly experienced,
the success of her argument depends on whether she is a reliable narrator. On
this ground, her argument leaves serious room for doubt.
Roiphe is in some respects a keen observer. She has a good eye for the
telling detail, for glimpsing the numerous complicated relationships between
personal style and political substance. Her dissection, for example, of the way
that Catharine MacKinnon uses the word "fuck" in her speeches about
pornography, is witty and revealing.4 She also has a well-tuned cynic's ear
for the passive-aggressive tendencies in contemporary victimization politics:
her discussion of the way in which the claim of having been silenced has
metamorphosed into a claim to power should chasten feminists who reach too
often for this rhetoric.4'
Yet, in other respects, Roiphe's narrative voice is troubling. In those
passages where she appears as a character in her own narration, Roiphe
functions more as a symbol than as a living, breathing protagonist. This oddly
limited self-revelation extends from the classroom4e 3 to Roiphe's own life in
the realm of the senses:
People have asked me if I have ever been date-raped. And thinking
back on complicated nights, on too many glasses of wine, on strange
41. THE MORNING AFTER, supra note 5, at 150-51.
42. Id. at 34-36.
43. Roiphe sometimes describes being at the receiving end of feminist hostilities without telling readers
precisely what she has said:
In a conversation about how terrible it is that a professor made a dirty joke in class, I offer my
opinion. Someone tells me that I don't understand the humiliation, the violence of these
comments. We look at each other, nothing more to say, our argument backed against a wall.
Id. at 114. Roiphe obviously did not find the joke to be "terrible," but whether her classmate's response
was temperate or totalizing, depends in large part on the substance and tone of Roiphe's comment. This
we are never told.
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and familiar beds, I would have to say yes. With such a sweeping
definition of rape, I wonder how many people there are, male or
female, who haven't been date-raped at one point or another.'
There are many ways in which an experiential narrator can establish her
credibility:45 she can say something so unconventional and potentially
stigmatizing in its revelation that she could have little motive for offering it
other than its truth; 46 she can offer an account so concrete and particularized
in its understanding that she thereby demonstrates her own credibility and
knowledge; she can tell a story sufficiently universalizable that it resonates
with readers' factually distinct experiences; or she can show herself to be
vulnerable to the same failings she finds in others. The foregoing narrative,
however, manifests none of these qualities, and Roiphe never offers enough
information to permit us to judge the credibility of her claim.47 For example,
"complicated nights, on too many glasses of wine, on strange and familiar
beds" is not an experiential account; it is a gesture toward the kind of
dramatic, attractively abandoned college sex life many of us would like to
think we had. Narrative may be a fine tool for placing others under the
microscope, but Roiphe is noticeably squeamish about using it on herself.
This suggestion of unreliability is underscored by Roiphe's handling of
some of the educational materials she critiques. Her discussion of a pamphlet
produced by Princeton's SHARE (Sexual Harassment/Assault Advising,
Resources & Education), for example, is disturbingly selective. Focusing on
the pamphlet's examples, Roiphe states that describing women subject to non-
physical coercion as becoming "nervous, depressed and angry" creates
"hothouse flowers [that] are going to wilt in the light of postcollege day."48
She completely fails to note the pamphlet's first instruction on dealing with
sexual harassment: "[s]peak up at the time and say 'no' to the harasser. Be
direct and firmly tell the harasser to stop harassing you .... If you say 'no,'
do so firmly and unequivocally. Don't apologize and don't smile. 4 9 The
44. Id. at 79.
45. This framework for evaluation is articulated in Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79
CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991).
46. In "Taking Back the Night," however, Roiphe makes the useful point that when such revelation
is not shocking but pro forma, the risk implicit in revelation itself no longer functions to guarantee the truth
of the narrative. THE MORNING AFrER, supra note 5, at 36.
47. Even if we were to take this narrative as a credible account of Roiphe's sex life, her use of it to
suggest that the definition of "rape" has become so expansive as to be dangerous has an additional problem.
There is nothing in her account that is evocative of rape-forcible stranger rape, emotionally exploitative
acquaintance rape, or otherwise. "Complicated nights, on too many glasses of wine, on strange and familiar
beds" contains no suggestion of coercion, the theme that unites traditional claims of stranger rape with more
inclusive versions focusing on emotional pressure. To attack the shift of focus from physical coercion to
emotional coercion by invoking an account that involves no coercion makes no sense, except as a reductio
ad absurdun that draws little support even from the rest of her argument.
48. Id. at 108-09.
49. SHARE, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSMENT (on file with author). The
pamphlet notes that if contemporaneous verbal communication is "uncomfortable or unsuccessful," women
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image conveyed by this instruction contrasts sharply with Roiphe's vision of
cowering victims; it suggests many women will be able to communicate their
disapproval of harassing behavior with energy and resolve. This kind of
selectivity, as Katha Politt has observed, also afflicts Roiphe's treatment of the
social science data on rape, and her single brief excursion into the law."
These difficulties indicate a lack of self-awareness that afflicts Roiphe's
narration throughout. So bent is she on exposure and critique, so eager to see
herself as the lone voice howling in the wilderness, that she misses the way in
which her rhetoric and posture begin to converge with those of her opponents.
Her claim to have been silenced by campus feminists ("[t]his book comes out
of ... all the times I didn't say something I was thinking because it might
offend the current feminist sensibility")5' sits oddly next to her indictment of
the political tyranny of the "silenced." Her lament for bygone days of
uninhibited sexual experimentation reflects the same trope of "paradise lost"
that informs the campus feminists' lament for a time of lost innocence. Even
her plaintive shifting under the shackles of campus sexual fear is caught up in
contradiction. She says of the "Take Back the Night" marchers:
These students say again and again, "It's not fair that I should feel
afraid." This is an idea that springs from privilege .... Considering
how many things there are to be afraid of and how many things are
not fair, being afraid to walk around Princeton, New Jersey late at
night does not seem like one of God's great injustices. 2
One wonders why she does not heed her own advice. It is difficult to place
one's trust in a narrator so unself-conscious as to miss these contradictions, or
so puerile as to resent AIDS primarily for cramping her sexual style.
53
But Roiphe's convergence with the posture of her opponents also extends
to matters of substance. The analysis that emerges from her stories displays a
totalizing bent, conflating the threatening and the innocuous in ways that make
illumination difficult. She sees paternalistic control and female fragility in
many places where they do in fact exist: injunctions restricting dating to public
places and depictions of college women as virginal innocents are surely a
problem. But she also sees these failings in places where the links between
should attempt the same communication in the form of a letter.
50. See Katha Politt, Not Just Bad Sex, NEwv YORKER, Oct. 4, 1993, at 220. In a searing critique, Politt
argues that Roiphe's case for date rape as a "problem of interpretation" relies on a single study, neglecting
a range of studies that problematize that conclusion. Id. at 222-23. She also explains that Roiphe's
discussion of a New Jersey rape case, which ostensibly demonstrated how feminist definitions have
infiltrated the law, mischaracterizes certain facts: the relationship between the parties, the age of the victim,
and the extent to which the victim offered resistance to the attack. Id. at 221-22. Politt concludes that
Roiphe may be "that rare grad student who has actually read 'Clarissa,' but when it comes to rape and
harassment she has not done her homework." Id. at 221.
51. THE MORNING AFTER, supra note 5, at 7.
52. Id. at 45.
53. Id. at 24-26.
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concern about male aggression, on the one hand, and female infantilization and
authoritarian enforcement, on the other, are far more tenuous.
Roiphe argues, for example, that campus feminists' claim that female
faculty members can be sexually harassed by male students is "insulting" to
women:
The mere fact of being a man doesn't give the male student so much
power that he can plow through social hierarchies, grabbing what he
wants, intimidating all the cowering female faculty in his path. The
assumption that female students or faculty must be protected from the
sexual harassment of male peers or inferiors promotes the regrettable
idea that men are natively more powerful than women.54
The notion that male students can "sexually harass" female faculty members
might, in fact, mean many things. It might mean, for example, that male
students experience "sex-role spillover,"55 as a result of which they treat
women faculty members according to the roles to which they most frequently
assign women-wife, sister, date-rather than according to the role their
position in the academic hierarchy suggests. It does not necessarily mean that
the women recipients of such treatment "cower"; this is Roiphe's own negative
image of the sexual harassment victim, not the response of the average sexual
harassment victim, nor a response the legal term implies or requires. And it
does not mean that the conduct necessarily requires an enforcement response:
one might imagine an educational effort or an individualized response alerting
male students to the possibility that they may be categorizing female faculty
members in inappropriate ways. Yet Roiphe yokes the three inexorably
together, thereby suggesting that the use of the term in this context has
authoritarian and infantilizing implications that need not, and often do not,
follow from it.
Another troubling example is her indictment of the American College
Health Association's advice that "if someone starts to offend you, tell them
firmly and early.",5 6 In an amusing but dubious leap, Roiphe compares this
advice to the counsel of the 1857 pamphlet, The Young Lady's Friend." One
could view the ACHA advice as fostering brittle and prudish attitudes among
college women-the word "offend" is perhaps ill-chosen in this regard. But
one could also view it as authorizing women to speak their minds and set their
own rules for social interaction. Roiphe's classmate, who showered milk on
her harasser, did little more than "tell [him] firmly and early" that his behavior
54. Id. at 89.
55. This term comes from BARBARA GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 134 (1985).
56. Id. at 66 (quoting AMERICAN COLLEGE HEALTH ASS'N, ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: Is DATING
DANGEROUS? (1991)).
57. THE MORNING AFTER, supra note 5, at 66.
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was unwelcome.58 Roiphe's leap from ACHA advice to Victoriana places
educational efforts inevitably on the side of authoritarian protection, and
neglects the extent to which they can assist women's own efforts at self-
assertion.
Roiphe also offers totalizing explanations for the strength of "rape crisis"
feminism on campus, explanations that are not only unitary but wrong. A
recurring theme in her narrative is that campus sexual fear reflects a
displacement of inevitable anxieties about entry into the world of sex.
Consequently, the appeal of "rape crisis" feminism lies in the certitudes it
offers to the sexually ambivalent, guilt-ridden, or unsure:
The idea of date rape comes at us fast and coherent. It comes at us
when we've just left home and haven't yet figured out where to put
our new futon or how to organize our new social life. The rhetoric
about date rape defines the terms, gives names to nameless
confusions, and sorts through mixed feelings with a sort of insistent
consistency. In the first rush of sexual experience, the fear of date
rape offers a tangible framework in which to locate fears that are
essentially abstract.59
Some forms of feminism may offer reassurance to women whose sexual
experience has left them uncomfortable or ambivalent. But at a time when
women are organizing to protest practices ranging from stalking to abuse in
intimate relationships, reducing campus concern about male aggression to
sexual confusion reflects a post-adolescent view of the world. It makes sense
for Roiphe to focus on feminism within the university; but to read that effort
in isolation from women's struggles throughout society is a solipsistic mistake.
Finally, Roiphe's effort founders in articulating a new direction for
feminists on campus. Having wielded her analytic wrecking ball on the current
campus movement, Roiphe has little to put in its place. In no sense does she
offer programmatic suggestions; her view of a more heterogeneous and
dignifying feminism must be drawn from between the lines. The two
suggestions that can be glimpsed in this manner offer scant reason for
optimism. The first is exemplified by Roiphe's own professed conduct: a kind
of sexual "carpe diem" that harkens back to the golden age of the sexual
revolution. Even setting aside the threat of AIDS-which only the foolish
would actually do-the problems with this re-creation are precisely those of
the original. For the most part, the sexual revolution was concerned with
removing attitudinal barriers to the kinds of sex that people already had-not
with changing what men expected or women wanted from sexual encounters.
Unlike her "sex wars" counterparts, who draw on feminist insights to depict
58. Id. at 101.
59. Id. at 82-83.
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a desiring female subject, Roiphe has little critical distance on conventional
sexual practices. In one faint attempt at re-imagining female sexuality, Roiphe
describes a campus fad of dancing without shirts at parties:
I remember the parties, dark rooms, beer, cigarettes, dancing shadows
dressed in mostly black.... Girls were dancing with girls, some
because they were interested in each other, others because they were
trying to catch the attention of the boy across the room. That spring
girls had started taking their shirts off at parties. I remember the bras,
black lace, white lace, pink lace. There was a drama in dancing in
bras, in crushing taboos beneath our feet. For most people, boys were
in the background those nights. They were not the point. Dancing
without shirts was intended as a bold statement about the triumph of
the female body, an eye-catching, spirit-lifting display of sexual
availability.
60
It takes a peculiar angle of vision to see stripping down to lace brassieres in
front of a room filled with men as "crushing taboos beneath our feet." Perhaps
these women show more enthusiasm about the prospect of sex than some who
rally to take back the night; but if displaying one's availability is the closest
women can come to sexual self-assertion, I can only hope this revolution will
not be televised.
Roiphe's other answer is a strange kind of equality feminism: one that
asserts not that women are just like men, but that all might be well if they
could be. The problem with women's response to male sexual aggression is
that it is, for lack of a better term, too feminine.6' Women faced with
coercive sexual behavior become anxious; they cry, they withdraw, they
express their lack of control by starving or distancing themselves from their
own bodies.62 The heroines of Roiphe's narrative are women who eschew this
kind of "cowering" for the casual sense of self-possession one associates with
social privilege, and for the easy physical self-assertion one most frequently
sees in men.63 They don't demand restrictive legislation or sit around in self-
help groups. They simply and firmly say no, and if the guy doesn't like it, they
pour a glass of milk on his head.
There is an appeal to this imagery: scores of women cheered it in "Thelma
and Louise." I liked "Thelma and Louise," too: it is satisfying to watch the
tables turned, to see what happens when women behave like Clint Eastwood.
But "Thelma and Louise" was fantasy; things are likely to be a good deal more
complicated in the real world. To begin with, there is the problem of
socialization: women who have come of age in this culture will have to be
60. Id. at 15-16.
61. Id. at 68-69.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., id. at 101, 120.
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exposed to a lot more than Katie Roiphe before all of them will feel
comfortable meeting a sexual advance with verbal or physical force. Beyond
that, Roiphe's analysis distorts the character of sexual threats in a way that
makes the more prevalent female responses less plausible than they should be.
In Roiphe's view, the problem of male coercion means that he wants it and she
doesn't, or has been brainwashed into thinking she doesn't. In the world
outside of Roiphe's imagination, coercion means that he controls your job,
your scholarship, your letters of reference. He may be blocking the door,
holding your car keys, or grabbing your shoulder too tightly on a deserted
street. Recognizing these inequalities of power-inequalities that make
unwanted sexual conduct truly anguishing-is a step Roiphe declines to take,
stating that "rules and laws that are based [on this premise] ... only reinforce
the image of women as powerless."64 Perhaps, but laws can communicate
inequalities in ways that encourage transformation, as well as ways that
perpetuate complacency and stasis. To ignore such inequalities, however, is
simply to blink reality.
Finally, even if an Eastwood-style response were socially plausible and
contextually prudent, it would only address the coercive behavior in the
individual case; it would do little to mitigate the broader social problem. The
recovery emphasis Roiphe decries in "rape crisis" feminism is problematic not
simply for its self-indulgence but for its self-referentiality. As women nurse
their grudges or heal their wounds, they fail to turn their efforts out towards
the institutional structures and social norms that helped to produce their injury
in the first place.65 The same is true of Roiphe's primary reliance on the
individualized response. The glass of milk may prevent a man from putting his
hands, or his penis, where you don't want them. But it will do little to keep
him from putting them where another woman doesn't want them, still less to
affect the cultural images, the social expectations, attitudes and sanctions, or
the interlocking economic inequalities that make it acceptable for him to
impose and costly for women to interject their preferences.
This last failure underscores the way in which, for Roiphe, the problem of
male sexual aggression truly is a problem of interpretation. It is because she
sees sexual coercion as a problem in women's heads-a leer we are free to
interpret as we please, a bad night reflecting one of the many ways in which
gender-neutral individuals put emotional pressure on each other-that she can
propose privatization and de-politicization as solutions. For those of us who
see "rape crisis" feminism as a response to a social and political problem,
more collective and outward-looking forms of action are required. It is to the
questions raised by these forms of action that I now turn.
64. Id. at 89-90.
65. A similar point is made in Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1441-
45 (1993).
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III. VICTIMIZATION, AUTONOMY, AND LAW
In the past decade, "dominance" feminism has become an influential
framework for understanding gender inequality.66 The sexual harassment
analysis that Catharine MacKinnon built on the experience of victims has
become federal law.67 The dominance-based anti-pornography ordinance
remains mired in First Amendment challenges.68 Yet its central insight-that
our popular culture reflects and fuels an eroticization of sexualized dominance
that is implicated in such widespread practices as rape and spousal
abuse-increasingly informs the way feminists and others think about sexual
and social interaction. Even if Roiphe's indictment of an emerging feminist
authoritarianism falls wide of the mark, we may still read her work as
reanimating longstanding questions about whether addressing a pervasive male
sexual dominance by resort to law reinforces images of women as vulnerable
or sexually passive.
A decade ago, Ellen Willis warned that regulating pornography would
reinforce images of "sex as an aggressive, unladylike activity.., an exercise
of erotic power ... taboo for women. 69 Joan Nestle assailed Andrea
Dworkin's "litany of the penis" as a threat to the legacy of determined,
sometimes costly, sexual agency exemplified by her mother.7° More recently,
Sharon Marcus has argued that women's vulnerability to rape is neither
biologically nor socially inevitable, but a socially constructed, legally endorsed
cultural "script" that women should "disrupt" by aggressive resistance.7
Roiphe's account lacks the theoretical sophistication of these earlier critiques.
66. I use the term "dominance" feminism to describe that strand of feminist (legal) theory that locates
gender oppression in the sexualized domination of women and the eroticization of that dominance through
pornography and other elements of popular culture. Dominance feminism proposes to address this issue
through legal regulation or prohibition of particular oppressive practices. Dominance theorizing provides
at least part of the academic underpinning for the political movement that Roiphe refers to, pejoratively,
as "rape crisis" feminism. While Catharine MacKinnon would probably be described as the primary-and
most visible-exponent of this theory, the following discussion applies not merely to MacKinnon, but to
the entire range of feminists who have worked theoretically, and often through political practice, to raise
consciousness about male sexualization of and aggression against women. I consider myself loosely within
this group, although I find dominance theory more persuasive in explaining some practices, such as rape
or sexual harassment, than in explaining others, such as work-family conflict or the regulation of fertile
women.
67. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
68. See American Book Sellers v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
69. See Ellen Willis, Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography, in POWERS OF DESIRE 460, 464 (Ann
Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
70. Joan Nestle, My Mother Liked To Fuck, in POWERS OF DESIRE, supra note 69, at 468.
71. See Sharon Marcus, Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theor. and Practice of Rape Prevention,
in JUDITH BUTLER & JOAN SCOFr, FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL (1992). In fact, in its critique of
culturally ascendant notions of women's vulnerability to rape and its advocacy of individualized, often
physical resistance, Marcus' argument bears some similarity to Roiphe's. However, Marcus reflects none
of the solipsism or self-importance that mar Roiphe's presentation. Marcus is temperate in her criticism of
those who have highlighted women's vulnerability, and is careful to identify feminists on both sides of the
debate. Moreover, for Marcus the individual aspects of disruptive resistance are tied to a larger, collective
project of contesting and pluralizing dominant understandings of women.
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It does not begin to disentangle the complicated assumptions that underlie the
connection between dominance-based regulation and perpetuation of female
sexual passivity. Yet it is framed in a way that has garnered considerable
attention.72 Thus it is important that feminists who value the contributions of
dominance theory explore the assumptions of Roiphe's challenge, and think
about their implications for feminist activism and education.
A. "Down by Law"?
Feminists might begin by disaggregating the parts of the negative imagery
Roiphe invokes. One reason that women within the dominance framework are
viewed by critics as passive or dependent is that they rely on mechanisms
provided by the state, the university, or other institutions to challenge
sexualized injury. We might ask, first, why the resort to state or other quasi-
legal protections should connote dependence, vulnerability, or passivity. In fact,
recent memory offers potent counter-examples of groups whose resort to law
was not associated with images of vulnerability or dependence. Black litigants
in 1960's school desegregation suits were not viewed by observers as
"cowering" behind a wall of legal rights. They were depicted as asserting
themselves, claiming their rights, and pressing strongly for the rectification of
injustices. Why are 1960's blacks (a group that included women) and 1990's
women (a group that includes blacks) depicted in such different ways? One
explanation may be that civil rights activists were prepared to rally, march,
engage in non-violent resistance, and expose themselves to considerable
72. The parallels between Roiphe's work and that of theorists such as Willis, Nestle, and Marcus raise
the question of why Roiphe's deeply flawed critique has been able to call wider attention to these issues
than earlier, more cogent critiques. One answer lies in the increasing prevalence of dominance-based
imagery. At the time that Willis and Nestle wrote, this imagery was comparatively new in feminist circles;
it had not become the subject of more widespread discussion, nor had it yet been embodied in legal or
regulatory regimes. With the advent of sexual harassment regulation and rape crisis activism, this vision
of women's oppression has become more familiar to the general public; this greater familiarity-and the
resistance it has wrought-have made Roiphe's critique a subject of more widespread interest.
A second factor has to do with Roiphe's accessibility and appeal to a broader public. Sharon Marcus'
powerful critique, for example, is contained in a collection of essays in postmodem feminist theory, known
mainly to academics; even were it more widely available, its reliance on academic forms of discourse
("rape is a language" is only one particularly stark example) would make it inaccessible to many readers.
Katie Roiphe, on the other hand, uses a story-telling mode that is accessible to a range of readers; her
clearly drawn thematic bottom lines create no ambiguity or confusion for a nonprofessional audience.
Perhaps more to the point, however, Roiphe is a highly mediagenic "sex warrior." Unlike her earlier
counterparts, many of whom were frank sexual subversives-sex workers, users and makers of
pornography, practitioners of sado-masochism, radical gay and lesbian activists-Katie Roiphe is a sexual
adventurer you can take home to mother. Her carefully cultivated "bad girl" image is saucy enough to
legitimate her critique of rape crisis feminists as latter-day Victorians, but sufficiently privileged,
heterosexual and bland ("complicated nights, on too many glasses of wine") to pose little challenge to
mainstream sexual sensibilities. It is unlikely that this quality has been lost on the editors of such
publications as the New York Tines. The Times has spotlighted Roiphe's book on the front page of its Book
Review section, run her editorials on its op-ed page, and featured a lengthy interview of Roiphe and her
mother, feminist essayist and novelist Anne Roiphe, in its Style section-a red-carpet treatment not usually
extended to first-time authors, which has no doubt contributed to the book's visibility.
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physical danger, in addition to litigating their cause. Yet feminist activists also
rely on methods other than litigation; critiques of feminist rallies and
educational initiatives occupy much of Roiphe's book. Other factors seem to
be at work in shaping contrasting images of these two overlapping groups.
One factor may be the mediating stereotypes through which the actions of
each group are interpreted. Most people interpret the actions of those around
them in light of stereotypes, which include not only stigmatizing caricatures,
but also shorthand explanations that help people to assimilate complex
aggregations of facts. One factor that encourages the disparate imagery
remarked above is that the actions of the groups "blacks" and "women" tend
to be interpreted according to different stereotypes. Women invoking legal
protections may be characterized as dependent or vulnerable because women,
as a group, have often been characterized as vulnerable and dependent.73
Moreover, such characteristics have explicitly been invoked, sometimes by
women, in seeking state intervention on their behalf.74 An additional piece of
the puzzle-that explains why black litigants have not been characterized in
this way, although some of them are women, and female litigants have,
although some of them are black-is provided by the analysis of Kimberle
Crenshaw. 75 Crenshaw argues that cultural imagery relating to blacks reflects
popular perceptions of black men, whereas cultural imagery relating to women
reflects popular perceptions of white women, thereby dichotomizing the
relevant imagery in ways that would not be possible were these images to
address the experiences of black women.76
Changing social views of government intervention may be a second factor
shaping these divergent perceptions of the resort to law. Black civil rights
litigants may have escaped characterization as vulnerable or dependent because
the government protection invoked by litigation was not, at that time,
understood to imply dependence. A Reagan-era mobilization of public
sentiment against Great Society programs has resulted in a reconceptualization
73. One reason for this characterization has been the continuing power of the ideology of
"domesticity" in shaping images of women, particularly women of racial and socioeconomic privilege.
According to the imagery of domesticity, women are appropriately sequestered in the home because of the
nurturing qualities that make them good familial caregivers, and the delicate sensibilities that make them
vulnerable in a turbulent public world. Women's relegation to the home, of course, makes them
economically dependent on men, who support and represent their families in the public world. For a
thoughtful recent discussion of the ideology of domesticity, see Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989). As black feminists since Sojourner Truth have observed, however, the ideology
of domesticity is neither appropriate nor frequently applied to black women, who have historically worked
in large numbers outside the home and have not generally been depicted as delicate or vulnerable. See, e.g.,
BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 160 (1981).
74. See AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 65-71 (1965).
75. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of
Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
76. Crenshaw's analysis may explain why initial accounts of civil rights activism neglected the
contributions of women, and why recent black victims of sexualized injury have been
evaluated-sometimes to their detriment-according to norms reflecting popular perceptions of white
women. See id. at 407-16 (making latter point with respect to Senate testimony of Anita Hill).
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of governmental protection: it is now more likely to be construed as conferring
an unearned advantage, or as connoting the dependent character of the
beneficiary.7 7 As the increasingly acrimonious debates over affirmative action
and welfare reform have demonstrated, these images now impede African-
American men and women, as well as women of a variety of races.
A third reason for the divergence in these images may be the unexamined
assumption of a public-private distinction. Exclusion from a school system is,
according to this framework, a public wrong, which makes (public) legal
redress entirely appropriate. However, sexualized injuries-particularly those
such as date rape and sexual harassment that occur between acquaintances-are
thought to be private wrongs. Despite the fact that they have been rendered
public by the creation of a legal claim, some critics persist in seeing their
prevention or rectification a private matter, a matter of individual
responsibility. Thus, the resort to legal means in such cases represents the
failure of individual responsibility-the woman's responsibility-to prevent or
resolve the problem. Feminist theory attempts to explain why reliance on this
distinction is inappropriate. It is shortsighted to call a sexualized injury private
when the creation of a legal claim acknowledges its social consequences.
Interactions in the "private" realm are so critically shaped by influences that
have their origins in the "public"-from economic inequalities to institutional
sanctions that reinforce gender role expectations-as to make a rigid boundary
between the two incoherent. This analysis explains why private responses may
be unavailing, and why the resort to law itself represents no failure. Yet it also
highlights a different aspect of the negative imagery in question: a female
victim so multiply compromised that she is unable to avert or address such
injuries herself-an image that is inconsistent with some women's experience
of or aspiration for autonomy.
B. Women's Victimization and Women's Autonomy
But why is a given woman's experience of, or aspiration for, autonomy
inconsistent with the recognition of socially created obstacles that prevent
many women from addressing sexualized injury on an individual basis? When
feminist theorists say that we should permit women recourse to law without
requiring them to address offenders on their own, they are not necessarily
saying that women are intrinsically unable to resist acquaintance rape or speak
straightforwardly to sexual harassers. It is important, in light of critiques such
77. It might be argued that this emergent stigma applies mainly to government assistance programs,
as opposed to the kind of constitutional protections invoked during the civil rights period. Yet I think this
distinction is too simplistic: affirmative action programs, which represent a remedial response to the kinds
of constitutional challenges to restricted institutional access that began in the civil rights period, have been
subject to some of the same negative imagery as public assistance programs.
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as Roiphe's, to ask how these positions have become confused, to the
detriment of feminist efforts at reform.
How the revelation of constraints on a group comes to be understood as
a statement implicating any given individual is the first question that requires
attention. This confusion reflects, in part, a misapprehension by feminism's
critics. The decision to authorize legal intervention in response to particular
acts may imply no statement whatsoever about the acts' victims. Laws that
make theft or assault a crime make no statement about the capacity of victims,
and require nothing more than that victims give evidence.78 Even laws that
premise intervention in part on the difficulties faced by victims in effecting
private resolution do not claim to describe all members of the victim class.
They may be based upon the probability of barriers to individualized response,
or the probability of barriers in the most serious cases. But they are not
inconsistent with the possibility of an assertive response by an individual
victim, nor does the existence of such a response cast doubt upon a legislative
scheme.
However, the connection between group-based statements and individual
inferences is not based wholly on a misunderstanding. The emerging link
between dominance theory and the rhetoric of recovery may also contribute to
this confusion. A recovery approach supplements the social-victim message of
feminist theory with an emphasis on individual victimization. Its focus on
individualized response to injury, as Roiphe notes, can make the experience of
the victim central to participants' self-conceptions. Its suggestion that the world
is full of "walking wounded" who have not yet discovered their injuries creates
a personal parallel to dominance feminism's political claim that practices such
as rape and spousal abuse are more pervasive than most people suspect. Yet,
contrary to Roiphe's suggestion, this conjunction is neither the intentional
product of dominance theorists nor the inevitable result of their arguments.
One can read reams of dominance theory without encountering the rhetoric of
recovery; even in Roiphe's critical exposition, MacKinnon prods students
toward concerted political action rather than self-absorption. If this merger has
become a problem, it is more indicative of a reversible mistake in feminist
strategy than a substantive flaw in the theory of women's sexual victimization.
How the notion of constraints on women's ability to respond comes to be
understood as an "insult" is a more important question. Here, a crucial factor
is the widespread assimilation of liberal precepts. According to liberal theory,
the qualities that are most distinctive and valuable in human beings are those
that inhere by virtue of their universal human nature. Prime among these is
78. Some forms of legal recourse informed by dominance feminism impose similarly weak
requirements of individualized action. The claim for sexual harassment, for example, requires the victim
to show "unwelcomeness," Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (citing 29 C.AR. §
1604.11(a) (1985)), which is frequently, though need not always be, demonstrated by reference to a
response by the victim to the harasser at the time.
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autonomy, the ability to direct one's life through the exercise of unencumbered
choice. For those who have been socialized to an incompletely reflective
acceptance of such precepts, there is something doubly insulting about being
identified by apparently contingent, non-universal, group-based qualities, and
being described as unable to transcend the psychological or economic
constraints that these qualities impose on autonomous self-direction.79 To be
a woman constrained by the incidents of a sexist society, in this view, is to
suffer a kind of compromised personhood. Addressing this argument has
proved a difficult task, as dominance feminists have been obliged to respond
both to its underlying premises, and to the complicating contexts in which they
have been applied.
This response has enjoyed the greatest success in the realm of political
theory, where liberal precepts are subject to the clearest articulation and
response. Dominance feminists and others have challenged the notion of
autonomy as the incident and measure of personhood from a range of different
starting points. Theorists more sympathetic to liberal premises have sought to
integrate descriptions of partially compromised autonomy into liberal theory,
depicting unencumbered choice as a human potential that is only incompletely
and differentially realized under present circumstances. 80 Other theorists have
rejected the notion of a universal, pre-social human nature, in favor of a view
emphasizing social construction. In this view, the most salient characteristics
of persons are forged in the limitless domain of the social, by singular or
multiple structures of oppression. Group-based characteristics 8' and
constraints are neither exceptional nor demeaning; they are, rather, predictable
incidents of social construction. Such theorists, in general, seek to displace
liberal precepts, but may also endeavor to accommodate them. Seeking partly
to explain the possibility of resistance under assumptions of social
79. My emphasis here is on the popular assimilation of liberal precepts. This assimilation inevitably
obscures important lines of analysis that inhere in some liberal theorizing. For example, although liberal
theory generally stresses the human potential for autonomous self-direction, and this element is incorporated
in popular conceptions of human capacity, some liberal theorists describe with considerable nuance the
factors that limit or compromise the capacity for autonomous self-direction. Theorists such as John Rawls
and Thomas Nagel have argued, for example, that notwithstanding this human potential, many people are
constrained in their ability to execute their chosen projects by factors that are beyond their immediate
control, such as discrimination and class-based inequalities of resources. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTIcE 71-75 (1971); and THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALrrY 102-05 (1991). Moreover, even
when one considers the popular assimilation of liberal precepts, one sees occasional departures from the
insistence on autonomous self-direction. Many people, including most of those who would describe
themselves as "liberal," favor consideration of the backgrounds of those who commit crimes in sentencing
and/or adjudication of guilt or innocence. However, it is possible that such arguments may simply reflect
a pathologization of those who commit crimes, and that a person's resort to such argumentation might be
consistent with a desire not to be viewed herself as a product of constraining circumstance.
80. See Nancy Hirschmann, Revisioning Freedom: Relationships, Context and the Politics of
Empowerment, in REVISIONING THE POLITICAL: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS
IN WESTER POLITICAL THEORY (Nancy Hirschmann & Christine Distefano eds., forthcoming 1994).
81. For a theorist who embraces a post-structuralist view, group-based characteristics or affinities are,
in fact, shifting and contingent, rendered unstable by intersecting social influences.
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construction, some theorists have described in this context a limited human
agency-the capacity to maneuver within institutional or cultural constraints."
These efforts at revision, modestly successful at the level of theory, have
encountered greater barriers in the areas of law and popular discourse. Lay
critics of a dominance-based vision do not always understand the extent to
which dichotomous assumptions about autonomy and incapacity affect their
thinking, or the fact that alternative assumptions are possible. Those who
understand their assumptions in a more self-conscious way may cling to the
notion of unencumbered choice, if not as a present description, then as a
statement of aspiration or an expression of potential.8 3 They may find notions
of partially compromised autonomy discouraging, or see notions of a complex,
divided self as inaccessible and offputting.
In the legal context there are other problems. Feminist legal advocates do
not simply, or even primarily, advance arguments about autonomy, social
construction, or the decentered self. They seek instead to win discrete legal
battles. This latter goal may initially be furthered by accepting rather than
challenging the liberal assumptions of legal decisionmakers.84 Feminists
working in the area of spousal abuse, for example, chose to counter
decisionmakers' assumption that battered women exercise unencumbered
choice by interposing images of unusual passivity or incapacity (i.e., "learned
helplessness").85 This strong account of compromised capacity did not
challenge judges' assumption of autonomous choice, but highlighted the
possibility of exceptions created by extreme circumstances. While this strategy
was initially successful, it set in motion a series of damaging dynamics.
Battered women recoiled in confusion and denial from the images of
82. See Vicki Schultz, Room To Maneuver (f)or a Room of One's Own? Practice Theory and Feminist
Practice, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 123 (1989) (articulating vision of feminist political resistance beginning
from premises of structural and post-structural theory).
83. For some observers, particularly those with a legal focus, the entire concern about the "insult" of
dominance theory may be less about the incapacity it describes than about the incapacity it encourages. Law
is sometimes viewed as more than a means of obtaining compensation (or retribution) for injurious acts:
it is also viewed as a system of incentives for encouraging socially optimal behavior. The objection to a
theory that authorizes legal recovery without requiring strong individualized response on the part of women
may be that it encourages passive or powerless behavior by failing to attach negative sanctions to it when
it occurs. This analysis opens up an interesting line of inquiry, but it has important drawbacks. First, in its
suggestion that legal incentives should be directed at the behavior of plaintiffs as well as defendants, it
reflects the assumption that women's conduct is at least implicated in sexualized injury. Second, it neglects
the problems inherent in using law to punish victim behavior, without comprehensively addressing the
conditions that produce victimization. Lenore Weitzman highlighted this problem when she studied a
California alimony regime that provided displaced homemakers with financial "incentives" to return to the
workforce. See LENORE WEII-IAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1984). Because not simply attitudinal
diffidence, but also discrimination, lack of training, and other tangible barriers made it difficult for longtime
homemakers to enter the workforce, legal insistence on financially independent behavior that might be the
goal of the future was severely punitive in the present. What is true of divorcing homemakers may also be
true of victims of date rape or sexual harassment.
84. In a recent article, I refer to this as the "law reform" vision of feminist legal advocacy. See
Kathryn Abrams, Unity, Narrative and Law, 13 STUD. L., POL. & SOc. 3, 27 (1993).
85. See LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).
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exceptional passivity; judges who used such images in an exculpatory fashion
in the context of battered women's self-defense began to use them punitively
in related custody proceedings. 6 When battered women's advocates offered
more complex, less fully compromised images of their clients, judges heard
unqualified images of incapacity.87 Their commitment to a dichotomous world
of autonomous individuals and pathological exception, reinforced in some
cases by the early arguments of battered women's advocates, made it hard to
understand that advocates were interposing an unfamiliar image of human
possibility.
A related dynamic may play a role in the acquaintance rape debate. To
counter the widespread belief that women exercise free choice in the context
of sex with acquaintances, dominance feminists have stressed a pattern of
cultural and institutional practices, culminating in the actual sexual encounter,
through which women's autonomy has been largely negated by male sexual
coercion.88 Women's constraint, in this account, is no longer a narrow
exception; it is, rather, part of a dichotomous depiction in which autonomy
remains the norm, but women, as a class, are prevented from achieving it. The
topsy-turvy social world of The Morning After attests, in exaggerated form, to
the responses that may be generated by this depiction. Although some women
feel vindicated by the revelations of male domination, others have begun to
recoil from the wholly compromised image of women they believe it
suggests.89  In addition, many participants, habituated by their own
dichotomous premises and by this strong account of the domination of women,
have become unable to discern the more qualified accounts of both male and
female agency that have sometimes been offered by feminist advocates.
Feminists must consider how to integrate the more complex accounts of
human nature and agency that have informed recent theoretical discussions into
popular and legal debates. Although this task is only now in its inception, it
is possible to sketch its general outlines. It will require, first, mobilizing the
appropriate imagery in describing the lives of women. Contradiction and
complexity, shifting combinations of choice and restriction, will need to be
depicted in concrete terms that a range of audiences can understand. 90 This
86. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 43-49 (1991).
87. Id.
88. For an interesting discussion of this strategic strain in Catharine MacKinnon's work, see Frances
Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1147 (1989) (reviewing CATHARINE
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)).
89. 1 expressed concern about this possible result in Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices,
24 GA. L. REv. 761 (1990).
90. For a discussion of the role of narratives in introducing these feminist understandings, see Abrams,
supra note 84, at 3. For particularly good examples of narratives depicting partially compromised autonomy
or decentered, divided selves, see Mahoney, supra note 86; and Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women
and Work- Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack
of Interest Argument, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1749 (1990).
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task will also require an interpretive framework that emphasizes that such
complex, constrained images are not exceptional or pathological: though the
particular constraints may be specific to the circumstances of a group, the
distance from a condition of unencumbered autonomy is more widely shared.
Finally, feminists will need to address the features of the legal world that make
accounts of partially compromised autonomy, or complex, divided identities
difficult to accommodate or comprehend.9 As this larger task of conceptual
transformation proceeds, however, feminists must also respond to the need for
a more practical education, particularly in the university setting.
C. The Challenge of Feminist Education
Dominance feminists' educational efforts have aimed primarily to produce
the social understanding that justifies the resort to law; and to demonstrate that
the problem is pervasive enough to require, or conceptualizable in terms that
permit, state intervention. This has meant that only intermittent attention has
been given to the ways in which women should negotiate the terrain of their
daily lives-a terrain marked less frequently by dramatic attacks than by banal
offenses and on-going coercive pressures. The vacuum created by this strategic
choice can be filled too readily by recovery counseling, or by student leaders
experimenting with the extremes of a political stance. If Roiphe's book tells
us anything, it is that dominance feminists should be more concerned with the
way that their message applies to the practical challenges of women's lives.
An appropriate education familiarizes women with legal or administrative
norms, so that they can identify and curtail violative practices. Yet such
technical knowledge can only be viewed as a beginning. Legal standards in
areas such as sexual harassment and acquaintance rape are still emerging. Even
where greater clarity exists, many acts lie in the grey areas created by the law;
others annoy or intimidate without approaching the standards required for
enforcement. Helping women to think about and respond to acts that may not
rise to the level of a violation is a crucial component of any educational
program. Yet, in this area, the consciousness-raising portion of the dominance
program has created tension with the need for more practical guidance.
Exposing the dynamic of domination within a variety of acts that may not,
technically speaking, reach the level of illegality is an important tool for
91. A growing body of legal scholarship has attempted to attend, in one way or another, to this task.
One portion of this literature has sought to address those legal standards that assume unencumbered choice,
so as to permit accommodation of partially constrained subjects. See Schultz, supra note 90; Joan Williams,
Gender Wlars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (1991). Another group
of articles has attempted to challenge the inflexibility of legal categories that prevent accommodation of
a subject with complex or contradictory characteristics. See Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex
Legal Subject, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994); James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Postmodern
Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489 (1991); Steven Winter, Indeterminacy and
Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1441 (1990).
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increasing awareness. It illustrates the pervasiveness of sexualized oppression,
highlights the strength and variety of influences that impede autonomous
response, and demonstrates the appropriateness of (some) legal regulation. But
this strategy, which feminists have designed to convince audiences who are
wed to liberal precepts, or are only beginning to perceive the dynamic of
dominance, may not be the most appropriate for young women who are at least
partially aware of this dynamic.9 Educational programs designed for this
group require a different emphasis: one that makes clear that the pervasiveness
of this oppressive dynamic does not make all acts touched by it equally
problematic. Not all coercive or sexualizing acts create legal violations, and not
all of them require the same kind of response.93 Having a teenager grab your
breast in a diner is not the same as having your academic mentor grab your
breast in his office. Young women need an education that empowers them to
make these kinds of distinctions and to act on them.
This is a difficult task, whose flexibility and contextuality makes it
continually vulnerable to the force of conventional understandings: if you
won't state unequivocally that a particular act was date rape or sexual
harassment, it becomes easier for others to insist that what happened was
simply a courtship ritual or harmless horseplay. Yet, in contexts where
dominance theory has begun to problematize a range of sexualized
behaviors,94 encouraging contextualized judgments about the presence and
extent of coercion can be appropriate and beneficial. Not only is it illuminating
for participants and observers, but it can also be authorizing for the target of
sexualized behavior, who learns to see a spectrum of coercive pressures, not
all of them incapacitating, and to explore a range of possible responses.
92. As I note above, this approach may backfire for those committed to liberal precepts as well. See
supra note 79 and accompanying text.
93. My own experience watching MacKinnon in public lectures is that she encourages just these kinds
of discriminating, and empowering, judgments when she answers questions from the audience; I have no
doubt that this is true of other dominance feminists as well. The problem is not what they have done on
an ad hoc basis, but what they have done to institutionalize these understandings in university programs.
94. What I am proposing here is not so much a "yes/no" judgment about the influence of dominance
theorizing as a "sliding scale" approach. The stronger the awareness of the pervasiveness of sexual coercion
in a particular setting, or within a particular population, the greater the need to emphasize the distinctions
among particular acts and the different possibilities of response. For example, this emphasis would be more
appropriate in a university setting which already featured well-established date rape and sexual harassment
counseling programs. Moreover, even in such settings, the message described above might be more suitable
to programs aimed primarily at women than to those directed toward men. The latter might require a more
systematic introduction to the insights of dominance feminism, and a discussion of context-specific
judgments that reflected a different emphasis (the ease, for example, of "stepping over the line" into
coercive pressure). Because this essay is concerned primarily with the attitudes of women toward sex and
sexual victimization, I focus in this section on educational efforts directed at women. I do not mean to
suggest, however, that educating women is the only, or even the primary means of reducing sexual
coercion. Because men are usually the perpetrators of such coercion, addressing and changing their
understandings of sexuality and masculinity is crucial as well. A number of programs aimed specifically
at college males have begun this important work. See MEN AND RAPE: THEORY, RESEARCH AND
PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Alan Berkowitz ed., forthcoming 1994).
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The initial step in fostering such judgment is to discuss criteria that might
assist in differentiation. Factors such as a hierarchical relationship between the
perpetrator and the target; threat to physical safety or bodily integrity;
pervasiveness and targeting of non-physical coercion; and opportunities for and
costs of avoidance or exit should all be considered in assessing the seriousness
of a sexualized act. Considering the possibility of individual resistance in cases
where the behavior is not physically threatening and the physical context is not
isolating may be one way of building confidence or encouraging feelings of
agency in the target of offensive behavior. But thinking creatively about
responses to more serious acts is also important. Roiphe's oppositional
juxtaposition of regulatory intervention and individualized response is a
fictional creation that serves her rhetorical ends. The invocation of legal
remedies can be combined with individual objection or political protest in ways
that preserve the agency and voice of the person aggrieved. Conversely, the
fact that an act may not be sufficiently coercive or severe to trigger regulatory
intervention does not relegate the target of the behavior to an individual
objection or a glass of milk. Individual letters, joint statements, political
protests, and advocacy of regulatory change are all transformative and self-
affirming options that should be given greater visibility in campus
discussions.
95
Another important task facing dominance feminists is to rethink the images
of women and sexuality that educational programs project. Such images may
be crucial to the sense of self-possession that helps women navigate situations
of coercive pressure. They may also shape women's ability to enjoy the non-
coercive aspects of sexual experience. This task must begin with decisions
about how to present women in rape education pamphlets and simulations. Any
program that fails to portray women's varying degrees of sexual assertiveness,
sexual experience, and self-possession in the face of aggressive or coercive
behavior, is simply off the mark. It risks misinforming less knowledgeable
women, and alienating those, like Roiphe, who are savvy enough to know
better. But this task must also include more far-reaching reflection on
appropriate stances for women toward a sometimes dangerous, sometimes
exhilarating sexual world. MacKinnon's refusal to engage in affirmative
imagery, however reasonably justified, has been a palpable drawback in this
area. 96 Roiphe's Manichaean contrast between timorous fixation on risk and
heedless embrace of experience simply recycles a dichotomous stereotype. At
95. Such efforts may already be more widespread than Roiphe is willing to admit. My own perception,
based on evidence no more anecdotal than Roiphe's own, is that "dissenters" such as Gillian Greensite and
Marjorie Metsch, see THE MORNING AFTER, supra note 5, at 81, who encourage critical reflection on
coercive behavior and decline to put words in students mouths, are in fact in the mainstream of campus
educational efforts. My point, however, is that building these kinds of programs should be a central part
of dominance feminists' task.
96. For a succinct iteration of this position, see CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 219
(1987).
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this transitional juncture, women may need to reject this dichotomizing
tendency for images that combine alert attention to risk with exhilaration or
enjoyment. Many people who become adept at risky, but gratifying activities
develop such a posture: keen, well-schooled awareness operating in the
background of thoroughgoing interest or enjoyment.97 It may be precisely the
sexual discomfort Roiphe describes that prevents us from experimenting with
this and other transitional metaphors for sexual experience. Abandoning that
discomfort for a more unencumbered exploration of what sex for women might
mean-in an age of AIDS, coercion and still-unabated pleasure-remains a
crucial object of educational efforts.
It would be wrong to view Roiphe as the primary instigator of the kinds
of inquiries outlined above. At best, her narrative reiterates, in less nuanced
form, critiques that were offered a decade ago by Ellen Willis, Joan Nestle,
and others; at worst, it reduces the vexed territory of contemporary women's
lives to a problem of their own making. Yet seizing the attention of a
politically complacent public, as we learned in the aftermath of Anita Hill's
testimony, is a large part of the battle. If Roiphe's book is vivid and
tendentious enough to bring these issues before a wider public, even so flawed
a work can make an important contribution.
97. AIDS activist Robin Goma has argued that thoroughgoing enjoyment of and comfort with
sexuality, and judicious response to risk go hand in hand. Citing the work of another activist, Sven-Erik
Ekeid, she notes that "only an individual who has the strength to say yes to sexuality, has the strength to
say no to risky sexual behavior." See Robin Goma, Delightful Visions: From Anti-Porn to Eroticizing Safer
Sex, in SEX EXPOSED: SEXUALITY AND THE PORNOGRAPHY DEBATE 175 (Lynne Segal & Mary McIntosh
eds., 1992). In one sense, this may sound similar to Roiphe's advocacy of sexual abandon, yet closer
scrutiny reveals important differences. For Gorna, "saying yes" to sexuality means understanding it in all
of its variety, distinguishing those forms which have been stigmatized for their coercive qualities from those
which have been stigmatized for failure to conform to mainstream heterosexist norms. It is from the
position of knowledge, born of critical investigation, rather than from heedless experience, that one
develops the comfort necessary to say "yes" to sexuality and "no" to risk.
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